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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1996). See also Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. However, this Court obtained jurisdiction when this appeal was poured-over
from the Utah Supreme Court.

IV. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This proceeding is an appeal from an Order and Final Judgment and Modifications
thereto issued by the Honorable Leslie Lewis whereby she awarded judgement in favor

7 -Lefavi v. Bertoch, Brief of Appellants

of plaintiff/appellee.

Judge Lewis awarded, inter alia, damages, together with

prejudgment interest and augmented the award with post judgment interest.

V. RELATED PRIOR APPEALS
The are no prior appeals relating to this matter. This Corrected Brief on Appeal
is to correct a lodged Brief on Appeal timely filed on behalf of Appellants on January 29,
1999.

VI. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR
ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST IS ALLOWED
WHERE SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY DID NOT EXIST AS TO THE AMOUNT
OF THE CLAIM PRIOR TO THE COURT RULING.
B.
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR
ERRED IN NOT CORRECTING AN EXPERT'S MATHEMATICAL ERROR IN
COMPUTING A MATERIAL FACT, I.E., EACH PARTY'S PROPORTIONATE
SHARE IN THE PROPERTY AT ISSUE.
C.
WHETHER THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DEVIATED FROM OR MISAPPLIED THE PARTIES' STIPULATION IN ASSESSING DAMAGES.
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D.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ACTED INCONSISTENTLY,
EXCLUDING APPELLANTS' COST OF ACQUIRING THE REST OF THE
PARTNERSHIP TO DETERMINE EACH OF THE PARTIES'
"PROPORTIONATE SHARE," BUT THEN GIVING LEFAVIA FULL SHARE
OF THE PROJECT OWNED BY THE APPELLANTS BEFORE LEFAVI
BOUGHT IN.

VII. STATEMENT OF CASE

A. Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from an Order and Final Judgment and Modifications thereto
issued by the Honorable Leslie Lewis, whereby she awarded judgement in favor of
plaintiff/appellee. Order and Final Judgment was entered on June 2, 1998 and modified
on June 15,1998. See copy of Order Of Final Judgment, attached herewith as Appendix
A and Modification of Judgment, attached herewith as Appendix B, both, incorporated
herein.
Appellee Bruce A. Lefavi ("Lefavi") sought damages against Richard A. Bertoch,
("Bertoch") and William E. Poulsen ("Poulsen") appellants, (also known collectively as
the "Appellants"), for breach of contract, fraud, false representation, conversion and
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fiduciary duty of care. The appellants counterclaimed alleging malicious prosecution,
abusive civil process, and breach of contract.

B. Course of Proceedings.
The Honorable Leslie Lewis after trial, found for plaintiff/appellee Lefavi, and
awarded judgment in his favor, and against Bertoch and Poulson jointly and severally.
During the trial the parties stipulated to accounting disputes that were pivotal to the
central issues of the case. However, not all of the main issues were stipulated to, and
therefore several were tried and determined in the lower court.
The stipulation and the controverted evidence are central to this appeal. The
Appellants appeal the ruling of the lower court with its accompanying Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. See copy of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached
herewith as Appendix C and incorporated herein. These findings and conclusions are
incorrect in some instances and in others are against the great weight of evidence
proffered at trial.

10 - Lefavi v. Bertoch, Brief ofAppellants

C. Summary of Relevant Facts.
Most of the following factual summaries are derived directly from Findings of
Fact contained in Appendix C. Citations to the Record or Transcript are in the footnotes.
1.

In or around the middle of 1975, a partnership known as the Richards
Street Development Company ("Richards Streef') acquired a lA interest in
four vacant lots ("Las Vegas Project") adjacent to the Las Vegas Airport
from Dasco, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and Dudley Smith, a resident of
Nevada. Bertoch and Poulsen each owned l/5th of Richards Street.1

2.

Richards Street's objective was to construct a hotel on the property.
Richards Street, however, was unable to obtain hotel financing and the lots
were later offered for sale.2

3.

In or around 1978, Bertoch and Poulsen bought the remaining 3/5ths of
Richards Street for $563,500. They also paid commissions of $101,519
in connection with purchase of the lots, which were the partnership's
main assets.3

1

R. 1479, Findings of Fact #2-3.

2

R. 1479, FOF 2.

3

R. 1358, Footnote 3.
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4.

By July 1978, the Las Vegas Project consisted of three parcels of real
property, known to the parties as Lot Numbers 8, 10 and l l . 4

5.

During July 1978, Lefavi purchased a "pro-rata share" of Bertoch's share
of the project, which in April, 1979 was changed to a "proportionate
share" of Appellants' interest in the Las Vegas Project.5 This gave Lefavi
the right to participate in a share of profits which was "proportionate" with
his investment, when compared to that of the Appellants. Id.

6.

The amount of Lefavi's initial investment was $6,600. From July 1978
through December, 1980, Lefavi made additional investments totaling
$68,875.6

7.

Appellants made lease, option, contract and expense payments over a
period of years from their additional investments to preserve their
investment rights.7 Lefavi did not participate in those payments, and as
indicated in # 6 above, his investment stopped after $68,875. Id.

4

R. 1479, FOF 5.

5

There was a dispute as to whether Lefavi purchased a "proportional interest" in only Bertoch's share of
the Las Vegas Project, or of both Appellants. For purposes of this Appeal we will assume that he purchased a
share of both Appellants' interest in the project.
6

R. 1481, FOF 8-10.

7

R. 1484, FOF 25.
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8.

The lots were sold in separate transactions. In August 1983, after the first
lot sale, a partial accounting computed Lefavi's share of the sale proceeds
as $32,182. Appellants paid the amount to Lefavi.8 The second sale took
place in 1985 and the third in 1988. 9 No proceeds from later sales were
paid to Lefavi.

9.

In an effort to narrow the issues and shorten the trial, Appellants and
Levafi stipulated that Lefavi was entitled to receive a "proportionate share"
of the proceeds from sales of the (4) lots, and that Appellants paid Lefavi
$68,875 to purchase Lefavi's interest in the Las Vegas Project.10

10.

Accounting records were inadequate for a full accounting. In order to
determine each party's "pro rata" share of the profit, it was necessary to
determine the proceeds from lot sales, costs, project expenses, the costs to
Appellants and Lefavi, etc. The accounting records for the period from
1978 until the 3rd sale in 1988, were incomplete. Substantial portions of

8

Lefavi admits that he received and retained that payment, but claims that it was paid as compensation
for some vague service he allegedly furnished to an unrelated entity in which Bertoch had a small financial
interest. Notwithstanding evidence to the contrary, the Court refused to allow credits to Appellants for that
payment.
9

10

R. 1484, FOF 28.
See Exhibit 140. Appendix D..
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the accounting records were missing, and the records located were
inadequate for a complete accounting. Each separately represented party
employed accountants who attempted to arrive at an accountingfromthe
partial records.11
11.

During the trial, experts and parties compromised and settled numerous
disputed fact and accounting issues.12 But for the stipulation, numerous
disputes would have been decided by the Court after weighing disputed
evidence. See Appendix D. That Stipulation is key to this Appeal.

12.

These issues included (a) appropriateness of alternative accounting
methods, (b) the income received form the lot sales, rent, etc., (c ) the
amount of income received from foreclosing property pledged by a
defaulting buyer, (d) whether each of the (9) stipulated cost items should
be added as part of the cost of the lots, (e) the amount to decrease
Appellant's cost of purchasing the 3/5 interest in the Richards partnership,
(f) the amount of expenses incurred, (g) projecting Lefavi's share of
proceeds to be between 3.49% and 5.27% of the sale proceeds based on

11

Tr. 598-604.

12

Tr. 598-604.
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a stipulation that the cost of the Las Vegas Project was estimated to be
between $1,440,368 and $2,105,387, (h) concurring that Lefavi also
received an additional $53,715 from Bertoch as a result of a series of stock
market transactions.13
13.

Lefavi adduced no testimony or other evidence which disputed appellants'
testimony on point. Canceled check and other documents showed that
appellants had paid $665,019 to buy the other 3/5 of the Richards
partnership, and for commissions to acquire the Las Vegas Project.14

14.

Rather than directly contradict the testimony of Bertoch, Lefavi asserted
the Fifth Amendment when asked questions regarding stock transactions,
resulting in a possible offset of amounts allegedly owed by appellants to
Lefavi.15

15.

The trial court ruled that appellants had not met their burden of proof for
the offsets. Even though appellants testimony, canceled checks and other

13

See Exhibit 140.

14

In Exhibit 140, the parties stipulated that appellants paid $400,000 to purchase 40% of Richard Street
owned by Daines and Nelson and $163,500 to DuBois to purchase his 20% of the Nevada partnership who,
together with Dasco, owned the Las Vegas Properties; and that defendants paid commissions of $101,519 to
Hansen and Bova to purchase the Las Vegas Properties, a total $665,01. See page 2, lines (16), (17) & (18) of
page 2, Exhibit 140.
15

R. 1587.
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documents concerning the additional $665,019 invested by appellai its as
undisputed,
necessary evidence
16.

held that Appellants •

not 'marshaled the

to meet their burden proof

At the conclusion of the trial, the lower court ruled in favoi of Lefavi
(dcspilr (In11 lU'iiit/fil w "mij!1',hi nil' r v i i l n i r r ) ,'1 She uwfiirdril judgment

it

the Appellants, jointly and severall), In the principal amount of
$159,717.00, together prejudgment interest of $96,482.00 as of
Decemi

prejudgmeiit

1, 1998 to the date of judgment of $3,911.25, foi a total judgment of
$260,110.25. This judgment was further augmented by post-judgment
interest at a rate of 7.468%.17
17.

/

ill I

in i I lli

" niii'i/hh

especially to eliminate the prejudgment interest.

iiiiiil

'//(AJ/MI'M/,

an- ::l

The efforts were

unsuccessful.

1503-05.
••• 1 0 5 .
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V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT8

Because the damage amounts were not fixed until a mid-trial stipulation, and for
public policy and other reasons, prejudgment interest should be denied and deleted from
the judgment.
Judge Lewis has made and refused to correct mathematical, legal and factual
errors, which grossly inflated the judgment she entered against defendants. This Court
should order a new trial, or at least that the trial court correct the errors.

VI.
A.
1.

ARGUMENT

Prejudgment interest was improperly awarded.

The trial court erred when it allowed pre-judgment interest in an

award where damages were disputed, and were not amenable to mathematical certainty
prior to a decision by the court. Prejudgment interest accounted for over $ 100,000 of the
$260,000 judgment entered. Its award should be reversed.

This Corrected Brief on Appeal is filed by Appellants as a correction of its Brief on Appeal lodged
with the Court on January 29, 1999

17-Lefavi v. Bertoch, Brief of Appellants

A "[t]rial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a
Supreme Court reviews for correctness."19 The standard of

question of law whir

review for this issue, then, is the correction of error standard,20 with no deference to
conclusions made by the trial court.21 "Correctness means that the appellate court
(

(III 11

III) 11 1 II II I 1 II I li II

1 II I 1 1

11 II 11 I II i l l

I l l Ill i l l III III II II 11

11 I 11

l i t | 111 l

111

II I 11 l 1

II 11 11 111 I ( 1 ( 1 P I ' " S

determination of law."22
A long series of Utah cases has considered and refined the rules as to the
<

I

factors concerning awards of prejudgment interest were summarized by the Court of
Appeals in their 1997 decision in Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Company:23 In Castillo
19

Cornia v. Wilcox* 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995); see also, Coalville City v. Lundgren* 930 P.2d 1206
ID. 1997); James Contractors v. Salt Lake City Corp.^ 888 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994).
\; See also, Pennington \ Misiate his. K t>, 358 Utah Adv. Rep. 5. 7 tliah 1998).
21

!:;

Id.
• • I »'i • t •< in," 'i[ • • I: "i I I-

<; ; ( ).531 ( F. • in

;

y 22 19 % ).

23

Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Company, 939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah App. 1997). The Court stated the
reasoiis and cited case-law precedent for award of prejudgment interest in an appropriate case in part as follows:
In Utah, prejudgment interest "represents an amount awarded as damages due
to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount owing under an
obligation." L&A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co.* 608 P.2d 626, 629
(Utah 1980). Accord Hermes Assocs. v. Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221,
1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 82 (1988). See also Trail Mountain
Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State lands & Forestry* 921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah
1996) (stating that, as a matter of public policy, prejudgment interest

18 Lefa v i v. Bertoch, Brief of Appellants

the Court specifically limited the circumstances when prejudgment interest may be
awarded as follows:
It (prejudgment interest) may be awarded where 'damage
is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and
figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular
time. 24
In support of that statement of prejudgment interest law, the Castillo Court cited
Andreason,25 which more fully explained limitations on the award of prejudgment
interest.
Although damages may be unliquidated, they must be
calculable through a mathematically certain procedure
allowing the court or the jury to fix the amount by
following 'fixed rules of evidence and known standards of
value ... rather than be[ing] guided by their best
judgment in assessing the amount9 or evaluating elements
lacking fixed standards by which to measure their value.
Fell 88 P. at 1007; Price-Orem v. Rollins, Brown &
Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah App. 1989). If sufficient
certainty exists, courts should allow interest from the time
when damages became fixed rather than from the date of the
judgment. Bjork, 560 P.2d at 317. However, 'where

compensates party for depreciating value of amount owed and deters intentional
withholding of money owed), cert denied,
U.S.
, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136
L.Ed. 2d 894 (1997).
Castillo, id., 939 P.2d (a) 1212.
24

Castillo, supra, 939 P.2d (a] 1212 (emphasis added).

25

See quotation from Castillo above. Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993), which was cited with approval by the Utah Court of Appeals in 1997 in Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty
Company, 939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah App. 1997).
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damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the
province of the jury to assess at the time of trial/ then
prejudgment interest is inappropriate. Price-Orem, 784
P.2d at 483 (quoting Fell, 88 P. at 1006).26
2.

In this case the lack of certainty precludes prejudgment interest. This

case is replete with disputed factual determinations which the trial court of necessity had
t

t

assessing the amount." There were multiple disputed facts which the lower court had to
consider in "evaluating elements lacking fixed standards by which to measure their
\ .ml in,

I I

Among the decisions in this case concerning which the trial court had to "be
guided by" its 'best judgment in assessing the amount" owed (if any), each of which
precludes the award of prejudgment interest, are the following:
(a)

Accounting records were incomplete. The accounting records

concerning the effort known as the "Las Vegas Project" were incomplete, inadequate
and/or non-existent Those w 1 ticl i did exist were very old, with many dating back to the
rnnl I • li i i ili I"11 il'i III "i i n r u ' s s j n

I'm llii 1 i i a ' i H i i i l m i ' r > p r r t s n i i f i i l i n n l hy llliiiiiiilllii | M i l n S

to spend literally hundreds of hours attempting to reconstruct an accounting of the
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Project. This was done based on incomplete information which was obtained from
various sources, including income tax returns, documents obtained from (former partner)
Dudley Smith,27 from Appellants' old files, etc.28 The paucity of financial records did
not lend themselves to any certainty or liquidated amount prior to trial.
(b) Compromise of disputed facts between accountants. In an effort
to limit the time necessary to determine issues, and the complex amounts to be
considered by the court, the experts met and for purposes of the trial negotiated
compromises of various disputed items and amounts. The result was set forth in trial
Exhibit 140,29 to which the parties stipulated.

Dudley Smith operated DASCO, which owned a XA interest in the Las Vegas Project, and which was
heavily involved in the related transactions. On motion of Respondent Lefavi, a scheduled trial date was continued
because two boxes of documents in the possession of Mr. Smith had recently been located, which boxes included
many documents concerning financial transactions involving the Project.
28

Gert Foerster, Respondent Lefavi's CPA, testified that he spent in excess of 100 hours reviewing
records to arrive at his conclusions, but that he did not talk with Hansen, DuBois, Daines, Dudley Smith, Jill
Langerman (a CPA who was DASCO's outside accountant), or to Thorns McMillan, (the buyer of some of the
subject lots), in connection with his investigation. Brad Townsend, appellants' CPA, did talk with DuBois,
Daines, Dudley Smith, Jill Langerman, CPA (from whom Townsend obtained some very helpful accounting
working papers), to lot purchaser McMillan, and to others in connection with his investigation, in addition to
spending even more time than that spent by Foerster, reviewing records and reconstructing the accounting records
to determine the amounts invested by each of the parties, amounts received from sale of property, other income and
expenses of the venture, what income was received from foreclosure and sale of lots received in connection with
the Sellen sale, amounts paid by appellants to Lefavi from proceeds from sale of parcels of land which were part of
the LV Project, credit due by reason of payment of the entire proceeds received from stock sold by Bertoch at the
request of Lefavi, etc. See Townsend's narrative discussion of his work in Exhibit 200.
29

See Appendix D for a copy of Exhibit 140.

21 - Lefavi v. Bertoch, Brief of Appellants

?

The experts narrowed the disputes, but this does not mean the damages

uncertainty of damages before they were determined by her, it appears that Judge Lewis
turned the stipulation into a reason to allow the interest, as if the stipulation in the midst
of trial meant that the disputes never existed.
In Exhibit 14030 the accountants summarized the results of their compromise
agreements, identified remaining unresolved items to be decided by the trial court, and
agreed upon the net dollar amount effect (set forth as a range) of each such decision by
t

the

compromise between the parties and their accountants would have been submitted to the
trial court for a decision based upon disputed evidence. The parties accepted the
a z :> :: i intai its' i leg ;: tiat 2 :!! agi eei 1: lei its h] ; stip 1 llatii ig t :: •
4.

Disputed issues were resolved by accountants' negotiations. Disputed

fact issues resolved by the negotiated agreement between the accountants included the
disputes set forth below. If not

e compromise between the accountants,

>uld

have been necessary for Judge Lewis to have decided each of the following disputed fact

>ee Appendix D to this Brief.
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issues by "evaluating elements lacking fixed standards by which to measure their
value,"32 each of which preclude the award of prejudgment interest. The experts agreed
on:
(i) Appropriate accounting method. The accounting methods used by
opposing experts were in dispute.

Essentially, disagreeing on which of several

appropriate accounting methods should be used in making their calculations;33 each of
which arrived at a different amount. Had the trial court heard the evidence and decided
which method was the most appropriate, it would have been necessary for the court to
"be guided by" its "best judgment'' in determining which method was the better, and to
thereby "assess(ing) the amount" of Lefavi's share.
(ii) Amount of proceeds from sale of property. The accountants resolved
their dispute as to the net amount received from each of the three property sales;34

32

See quotation cited in U 5, P. 3 above, from Anderson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177
(Utah App. 1993). Anderson was quoted with approval in 1997 in Castillo, supra.
33

Although the accountants ultimately agreed to use the tax return method, Townsend's computations
included three alternative methods (Appellants' proposed Ex. 201), including: (a) the Cash Flow Method; (b)
the Escrow Method; and (c) the tax return method. By reason of the agreement between the accountants Ex. 201,
Ex. 203, 215 and 218 and supporting Ex. 202 thru 223 were not actually used in the trial, however said exhibits
demonstrated three alternative accounting methods which were used in an effort to arrive at an accounting from
inadequate records.
34

A substantial dispute existed between the accountants as to the net proceeds received from the three
property sales which ultimately resulted in cash flow to Bertoch and Poulson.
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(iii) Net proceeds from foreclosure and sale of lots. The net income
i

I

known as the Sellen Trust Deed was no longer an issue after the Exhibit 140 stipulation
by the accounting experts;
(i i ) Purchase price of property "' i "lie accountants agreed on "the amount
of nine separate items to be added to the property cost basis, as shown on the income tax
returns;
(v)

Bertoch & Poulson cost to buy share of other owners.

a ;:> : : i in: itai its helped 1:1 i

The

nellants to

purchase DuBois' share of the project and the amount paid by appellants to purchase the
Daines and Nelson share of the project, leaving to Judge Lewis the decision as to
1

• :)ii ill. ::! 1: z all :: 2 ::l as appellai its' costs;
(\i)

Income and expenses of venture. The accountants considered and

agreed upon the effect of General atid Administrative expenses of the venture;
(\ ii)

Alternative claim regarding L e favi's shari

I In iii

iiiiliiuls

agreed that Lefavi's share of the sales proceeds was 3.49% or 5.27%, or some percentage
between those amounts, depending upon whether the cost to appellants to purchase from

2 4 - LLJIIVI
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others their shares of the Las Vegas Project was part of appellants' investment.35 Those
alternate percentages are based upon the amounts the trial court determined to be the
amounts invested in the Las Vegas Project by Bertoch and Poulson, which is necessary
in order to determine Lefavi's "proportional interest."36
(viii)

Agreements as to appellants9 investment in Project.

The

accountants agreed that Bertoch's and Poulson's combined investment was at least
$1,440,368, that Bertoch and Poulson had paid an additional $665,019.44 to Hansen,
Bova, DuBois, Daines and Hansen, and that if the trial court determined that those
additional payments were part of their investment, the appellants' total investment was
$2,105,387.39.37

See Line (5), columns (B) and (C) of page 1 of Ex. 140 and discussion below.
36

See Ex. 9.

37

See Line (3), Column (C) of page 1 of Ex. 140. See Appendix D for a copy of Exhibit 140. The
difference of $665,019.44 is the total of the amounts agreed upon between the accountants as shown on page 2,
Col. (B) of Ex. 140, for the following payments made by Bertoch & Poulsen:
Line#
(16)
(17)
(18)

Purpose of payment
Payment of Commissions to Hansen and Bova
Buyout of DuBois
Buyout of Daines & Nelson ($200,000 each)
Total

Amount paid
$ 101,519.44
163,500.00
400,000.00
$ 665,019.44
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Bertoch testified that they had made payments to Hansen, Bova and Dubois which
the $265,019.44 agreed upon between the accountants, as
shown on Ex. 140.39 The total amount paid to Hansen, Bova and Dubois were disputed
issues of fact which, but for the accountants' agreement, the court would have had to
if 1 i, • ni 11! i;* 111 II s i • I (I in in 11 in i

mi in il I in I mi in in in | i • \ in 111»111, • i •

I mi i 11 in in ( i l l I

mi I in HI d i s p u t e «-

stipulation Bertoch waived the claim that the amount was higher. Even though the
agreement between the accountants made it unnecessary for the Court to rule on the
disputed items, the existence of those disputes precludes llin iivi .in J I ( ejudgment
interest.

i!K

As shown by proposed Ex. 322 the amounts claimed to have been paid by appellants to Hansen, Bova
and DuBois were as follows, which is $57,677 73 more than the $265,019 44 which the accountants agreed was
paid to those persons;
Paid to Hansen per Ex. 322
Paid to Bova
Paid to Dubois
Total
Amount agreed upon between accountants
Downward adjustment by accountants

$ 60,044.00
61,753.17
200.900.00
322,697.17
265,019.44
$ 57,677.73

39

The accountants agreed that Bertoch and Poulson paid tin
Dubois, as shown in lines (16) and (17), Col. (B), page 2 of Ex. 140 :
Line # Purpose of payment
(16) Payment of Commissions to Hansen and Bova
(17) Buyout of DuBois
Total

Amount paid
$101,519.44
163,500.00
$ 265,019.44
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the

(ix) General & administrative expenses.

The accountant agreement

settled the dispute as to which of the alternative methods should be used to compute
General and Administrative Expenses (G&A).40 There was a dispute at trial between
Lefavi and Bertoch as to whether Exhibit 312 was Attachment "A" to their original
agreement, Ex. 6. Lefavi denied that he had seen a copy of Ex. 31241 prior to the lawsuit,
and denied he had agreed that 20% or any other amount should be deducted for G&A in
computing his share of the proceeds. Bertoch insisted the opposite.
The accountants agreed that G&A should be 20% of the gross, and their
computations and the parties confirmed that agreement by their stipulation as to the
accountant's schedules, Ex. 140. Line (14) of Ex. 140 shows the net effect of G&A on
Lefavi's share as $5,951 based upon income as computed by Townsend, accountant for
the appellants, and as $17,287 based upon income as computed by Foerster, accountant
for Lefavi. The trial court could have adopted the "Minimum," "Maximum," or some
middle ground as the correct computation to determine Lefavi's share of the proceeds.

A substantial dispute existed as to whether General and Administrative expenses should be allowed,
and if so, whether they should be computed as 20% of the gross, or if they should be based upon actual expenses
incurred. During trial there was a substantial dispute as to whether Lefavi had agreed to the terms of Ex. 312,
which provided for G&A to be computed as 20% of the gross.
41

The typewritten portion of Ex. 312 provides, "Twenty Percent of the gross income will be held by
Richards Street Development co. for general and administrative expenses."
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But it is undisputed that by stipulating to Exhibit 140 the parties resolved the
G&A dispute and agreed that 20% of the gross should be deduced for G&A expenses.
That dispute would also have been left to the court's decision after weighing conflicting
evidence, but for the agreement between the accountants. That dispute, which was not
resolved until mid-trial stipulation, also precludes the award of prejudgment
interest.
(x) Credit for stock sales. The accountants resolved the dispute as to
the $53,71542 amount of the net credit to be allowed to Bertoch for proceeds given to
Lefavi from stock purchased and sold by Bertoch in the stock market (if the trial judge
determined to allow that credit). During the trial Lefavi disputed both the amount of the
credit and whether credit should be allowed.
The fact that the accountants settled the dispute as to the amount of credit does
not change the fact that, but for their agreement, this dispute too would have had to be
resolved by Judge Lewis using judgment based upon disputed trial evidence. Whether
the credit would be allowed at all was a dispute which the court had to resolve using
judgment. Each of those disputes preclude the award of prejudgment interest.
42

See Line (17), Col. (B) and (C), page 1 of Ex. 140. The stock offset consists of $36,693 [Ex. 140, line
(16), col. (B) & (C)] which was applied to cover Lefavi's shortfall in recovering his original $68,875 investment in
the LV Project and $17,022 [Ex. 140, line (17), col. (B) & (C)J, which was Bertoch's share of the profit retained by
Lefavi.
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5.

Still more issues remained to be resolved by the Court, even after the

stipulation. Disputed factual issues not resolved by the accountants, and which still had
to be decided (and were decided) by Judge Lewis, included the following.
(a)

Whether appellants9 cost to purchase shares of other partners

should be included to determine appellants "pro-rata share"43 or "proportional
interest"44 in the Las Vegas Project. The parties disputed to the end as to whether
investments by Bertoch and Poulsen in the Project should be deemed to include their
purchase cost of shares of the Project bought from DuBois, Daines and Nelson.45 See
discussion later in this Brief.
In deciding those issues, the court had to use its "best judgment" based upon
evidence. It necessarily follows that Lefavi's share was not "calculable through a
mathematically certain procedure," and that Lefavi' s claim for prejudgment interest must
be denied. Shares of Las Vegas Project investment purchased from others are as follows:

43

See 7/19/78 agreement, Ex. 6.

44

See 4/19/79 agreement, Ex. 9.

45

Before appellants bought those shares, appellants each owned 1/5 (for a collective total of 2/5) and
DuBois, Daines and Nelson each owned 1/5, for a total of 3/5 of XA of the LV Project. As a result of those
purchases appellants collectively owned the entire 5/5 of XA of the LV Project. Stated another way, before the
purchase appellants collectively owned 40% and after the purchase they owned 100% of Vi of the L V. Project. As
a result of those purchases Lefavis share also increased from a "proportional interest" in 40% to a proportional
interest in 100% of Vi of the LV Project.
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(i) Appellants9 payments to Hansen. Although the agreement
between the accountants resolved the dispute as to the amount paid to Hansen,46 the
Court still had to decide whether Bertoch and Poulsen were entitled to include the
payments to Hansen in computing their investment in the Project.
(ii) Appellants9 payments to Bova. Although the agreement
between the accountants resolved the dispute as to the amount paid to Bova,47 the trial
court still had to decide whether Bertoch and Poulsen were entitled to include the
payments to Bova in computing their investment in the LV Project.
(iii) Appellants9 payments to DuBois. Although the accountants'
agreement resolved the dispute as to the amount paid to DuBois,48 Judge Lewis still had
to decide whether to include the payments to DuBois in computing Bertoch and
Poulsen's investment in the Project.
(iv) How Appellants9 payments to Daines and Nelson affects
Lefavi9s share of proceeds. The accountants agreed that Bertoch and Poulson had paid
$400,000 to Daines and Nelson49 to purchase their share of the Project. The trial court
was left to apply those amounts pursuant to its own judgment.
Judge Lewis did make the above determinations, and in virtually every instance
she determined them against Appellants and in favor of Lefavi.

40

See U 7(g), P. 8 above.

47

See K 7(g), P. 8 above.

48

See K 7(g), P. 8 above.

Many of those

49

See Ex. 140, page 2, line (18) where the accountants agreed that $200,000 each, for a total of
$400,000, had been paid by Bertoch and Poulson to Daines and Nelson to purchase their share of the LV Project.
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determinations were in error (see discussion in sections which follow). But the very fact
she had to consider and rule on those disputes illustrates the impropriety of then
awarding prejudgment interest, on the erroneous notion that the amount of damage was
liquidated years earlier.
6.

The issues which were determined only at trial were material. For

example, if appellants' purchase of shares of the Las Vegas Project were excluded
(which they were) in computing their investment, then Lefavi's share should have been
reduced to a "proportional interest" in only 40% of appellants' interest.50 See discussion
later in this Brief.51
Exclusion of any purchases of interest from other partners would proportionally
reduce Lefavi's "proportional share." If one or more purchases by defendant of other
partners' interest in the Las Vegas Project would have been excluded in computing

Appellant Bertoch testified that, but for appellants' purchases of DuBois, Daines and Nelson's shares
of the Project, appellants and Lefavi would have collectively owned onl> 2/5 of the Vi of the LV Project not owned
by DASCO. In other words, Lefavi's share (whatever that share was detennined to be) would be 40% of the share
he will receive as a result of appellants acquiring Daines, Nelson and DuBois shares of the LV Project. The Court
must decide from evidence adduced at the trial whether none, some, or all of the cost to appellants to purchase
Daines, Nelson and DuBois shares of the LV Project are part of appellants' investment in the LV Project.
51

If the Court were not to include those purchases of partnership shares, then appellants' investment is
$1,440,368, and Lefavi's share of of the proceeds from the LV Project is 5.27%. See Ex. 140, page 2, line (15) and
page 1, line (3), column (C). If the Court were to include appellants' $665,019.44 purchase cost of said partnership
shares, then Lefavi's total investment in the LV Project is $2,105,387.39. See Ex. 140, page 2, line (15) and page
1, line (3), column (C). Lefavi's share of proceeds from the LV Project is 3.49%. See Ex. 140, page 2, line (21),
column (B) and page 1, line (5), column (B).
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appellants' investment, then Lefavi's share of the Project would have been below 5.27%,
and perhaps as low as 3.49%.52 It follows that if Lefavi did not invest in a "proportional
share" of the interests acquired from Daines, Nelson or DuBois, then his "proportional
share" would not include the 1/5 of the Las Vegas Project acquired by appellants from
each of the excluded purchases, and that his "proportional share" would be
proportionately less. As discussed above, because in deciding those issues the trial
court had to use its "best judgment" based upon evidence, it necessarily follows that
Lefavi's share is not "calculable through a mathematically certain procedure," and
it was error to award prejudgment interest.53
Another material, disputed issue requiring the trial court's best judgment, was
whether to allow Appellants a credit for a $32,182 payment Bertoch made to Lefavi.54
See also discussion later in this Brief.

52

See Ex. 140, page 2.

53

See, Andreason v. Aetna Cos. & Sur Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Castillo v. Atlanta
Casualty Company, 939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah App. 1997).
54

This issue was whether Check #1148. dated 8/15/83 for $32,182, was paid to Lefavi as what was then
believed to be his share of proceeds from the first sale. Appellants' testimony was that the check was payment of
what was then believed to be Lefavi's share of the proceeds from the first sale, which testimony was supported by
August, 1983 computations by Poulson's accountant. Ex. 226 summarizes Scott Poulsen's August, 1983
computation which arrive at the $32,182 payment to Lefavi. A copy of the $32,182 check is in Ex. 252. Lefavi
accepted the check, but at trial he claimed it pertained to some unrelated transaction.
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Prejudgment interest is not allowed because amount due was not calculable
without the Court making judgmental decisions concerning disputed facts. As
discussed above and summarized in the footnote,55 but for the negotiations and the
resulting agreements between the accountants and parties, the court would have been
required to consider and decide each of those disputes, and to use its "best judgment in
assessing the amount" (if any) owed to Lefavi. Even after that agreement, many disputed
factual issues remain for resolution by the court, as illustrated above.
The fact that the accountant and parties were able to settle some disputed and to
thereby narrow the issues to shorten the trial and avoid the necessity of presenting
extensive evidence and many factual issues to the court for decisions did change the fact
that Lefavi's share could not be where the Court must use its "best judgment" based upon
evidence, into a case where Lefavi's share is was "calculable through a mathematically

But for the stipulation, numerous disputes would have been decided by the Court after weighing
disputed evidence, including such things as: (a) which of the alternative accounting methods was most
appropriate, (b) the income received from lot sales, rent, etc. (c) the amount of income received from foreclosing
property pledged by a buyer who defaulted, (d) whether each of the nine cost items stipulated to should be added as
part of the cost of the lots, (e) the amount to downwardly adjust Appellants' cost of purchasing the 3/5 interest in
Richards partnership, (f) the amount of the general and administrative expenses of the Project, (g) As part of the
stipulation the accountants agreed that Appellants' cost of the Project was between $1,440,368 and $2,105,387,
and that as a result Appellee's share of the proceeds was between 3.49% and 5.27% of the sale proceeds,
depending upon which of the unresolved items listed in Ex. 140 were allowed, (h) The parties also agreed that as
a result of a series of stock market transactions. Appellee received $53,715 more from Bertoch than he was entitled
to receive, which Bertoch claimed as an offset.
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certain procedure" by merely following "fixed rules of evidence and known standards
of value."56
7.

The trial court punished Appellants for their willingness to compromise.

Judge Lewis held that the damages were liquidated enough that prejudgment interest
would be awarded, even though the "liquidation" of the damages arose directlyfromthe
mid-trial stipulation fixing amounts and damage ranges. To assess over $100,000
damages against a defendant which could not have been assessed if stipulations were not
entered into does violence to public policy favoring stipulation and the conservation of
attorney fees and judicial time and resources.
The Court should rule that whether the damages were liquidated (for prejudgment
interest entitlement purposes) is determined at the time the action is filed, or at some
other pre-trial time, and cannot be affected by the parties and their experts joining to
stipulate to eliminate some uncertainty from thefinancialissues.
Therefore, Lefavi's award of prejudgment interest must be reversed.

56

Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Castillo v. Atlanta
Casualty Company, 939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah App. 1997).
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B.

It was necessary to get the math right in order for the damages to be fixed.
1.

However, simple math errors were made by Judge Lewis, which she

declined to correct. For purposes of this issue, the Court may assume that the trial court
was correct in determining that Appellants Bertoch and Poulson were liable to Lefavi.
But even assuming liability, the damages must be computed correctly for the judgment
to stand. Brief mention of the facts pertaining to this issue is helpful.
Las Vegas property was purchased. In about 1975 defendants/appellants
Bertoch and Poulson were each 1/5 partners in the Richards Street Partnership, which
acquired a V-i interest in 4 vacant lots in Las Vegas. They later acquired the rest of the
partnership, and of the property, paying $563,500 (stipulated)57 plus $101,519 in
commissions (also stipulated).58 The plan was to build a hotel on the property.
Lefavi bought a "proportionate share" of Project. In 1978 Plaintiff/Appellee
Lefavi purchased a "pro-rata share" of Bertoch's share of the Project, which in 1979 was

See Exhibit 140, stipulated to at R. 598-604.
See Exhibit 140, stipulated to at R. 598-604.
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changed to a "proportionate share"59 of Bertoch's and Poulson's60 interests in the Law
Vegas Project.
Hotel project failed & lots were sold. If the hotel had been a success, of course
there would have been no lawsuit. But it did fail, the expected profits did not come, and
this case ensured.
The parties were unable to obtain financing, so the Hotel Project was abandoned
and the lots were offered for sale. Over the next few years Appellants Bertoch and
Poulson (and a Mr. Smith) made lease, option, contract and expense payments to finance
payments that had to be made to preserve their right to purchase the lots. Lefavi refused
to participate. The lots were eventually sold in 3 separate transactions.
Thus it became important at trial for the court to determine what the
"proportionate share" of each party in the partnership, and to then calculate the correct
amount of net proceeds of sale to which the proportion should be applied. Determining
Lefavi's proportion, figuring out the net profit of the three parties, and applying the

The hand-written 7/19/78 contract [Ex. 6] provided that each would own a "pro-rata share" and some
interest. The 4/19/79 hand-written agreement [Ex. 9] eliminated interest, and provided that Appellants and
Appellee each owned a "proportional interest" in the Project, based upon the amounts each invested in the Project.
60

There was a dispute as to whether Lefavi was buying a "proportional interest" in only Appellant
Bertoch's share of the Project, or of both Appellants. For purposes of the appeal it may be assumed that, as the
trial court found, Lefavi purchased a share of both Appellants' interest in the Project.
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former to the latter results in the damages owed. Fortunately, in the middle of trial the
parties stipulated to most of the needed numbers.
2.

The trial court incorrectly applied the stipulation.61 Both sides of the

case employed financial expert witnesses. In order to determine each party's "pro-rata
share" of the profit, among other things it was necessary to determine the proceeds from
lot sales, lot costs, project expenses, the costs to Appellants and Appellee, etc. The
accounting records (for the 10 year period from 1978 when Appellee purchased an
interest in the Project until the 3rd and final sale in 1988) were incomplete, substantial
portions of the accounting records were missing, and the records located were inadequate
to make a complete accounting. Each party employed accountants who spent extensive
amount of time attempting to arrive at an accounting from partial records.
In the midst of trial, the experts had lunch together and ironed out many
differences on August 28th. With their help, and in order to preserve the parties' and the
court's resources, financial parameters were agreed to.62 The stipulation was largely

61

See, Wentz Equipment v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 673 P.2d 1193 (Kansas App. 1983) (the trial court
is bound by the fact stipulated to, and when the parties stipulate to facts, a trial court can render only such
judgment as those facts warrant).
62

Among other things, the parties stipulated that plaintiff/appellee Lefavi was entitled to received a
"proportionate share" of the proceeds from all 4 lots, and that Appellant had paid $68,875 to purchase his interest
in the Project.
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crafted by cooperation between the two experts.63 A copy of the numbers stipulated to
was received as Exhibit 140. It is included in Appendix D to this brief. The parties
compromised and settled numerous disputed fact and accounting issues.64
But the obvious benefit of stipulating was largely nullified when the trial court
wrongly applied the stipulation and awarded damages which exceeded all
reasonableness. Examples are set forth in the argument sections which follow.
Stipulations are favored, and should be honored by the courts.65 Where they enter
into a stipulation rather than to assemble witnesses and put on proofs as to an issue, the
decree that can be entered in the case should be in conformity therewith.66 The
stipulation has a "greater binding effect" than the findings of fact by the trial court as to

w

Tr. 598-604.

64

But for the stipulation, numerous disputes would have been decided by the Court after weighing
disputed evidence, including such things as: (a) which of the alternative accounting methods was most
appropriate, (b) the income received from lot sales, rent, etc. (c) the amount of income received from foreclosing
property pledged by a buyer who defaulted, (d) whether each of the nine cost items stipulated to should be added as
part of the cost of the lots, (e) the amount to downwardly adjust Appellants' cost of purchasing the 3/5 interest in
Richards partnership, (f) the amount of the general and administrative expenses of the Project, (g) As part of the
stipulation the accountants agreed that Appellants' cost of the Project was between $1,440,368 and $2,105,387,
and that as a result Appellee's share of the proceeds was between 3.49% and 5.27% of the sale proceeds,
depending upon which of the unresolved items listed in Ex. 140 were allowed, (h) The parties also agreed that as
a result of a series of stock market transactions. Appellee received $53,715 more from Bertoch than he was entitled
to receive, which Bertoch claimed as an offset.
65

See, Richlands Irr. Co. v. WesMewlrr. Co., 96 Utah 403 (Utah 1938).
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evidence, since a court may modify findings in apt time, but cannot modify the contract
of the parties.67
As part of the stipulation, the accountants agreed that Appellants' cost of the
Project was between $1,440,368 and $2,105,387, and that as a result Appellee's share
of the proceeds was between 3.49% and 5.27% of the sale proceeds, depending upon
which of the unresolved items listed in Ex. 140 were allowed.
The parties also agreed that as a result of a series of stock market transactions,
Appellee received $53,715 more from Bertoch than he was entitled to receive, which
Bertoch claimed as an offset.
The trial court acted inconsistently, excluding Appellants9 cost of acquiring
the rest of the partnership to determine each of the parties' "proportionate
share," but then giving Lefavi a full share of the Project owned by the Appellants
before Lefavi bought in.
C.

1.

The stipulated ranges were applied illogically. As noted, the stipulation

provided a range of numbers for the court to apply, depending on its legal rulings.
Surprisingly, though, Judge Lewis gave plaintiff/appellee Lefavi the best of both worlds:
she gave him a full share of the partnership interests which defendants/appellants had

Id. But see, First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel and Associates^ 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979)
(sets forth limited circumstances under which a court can occasionally relieve a party of its stipulation). Rarely is
relief from a stipulation pemiitted, though, since courts are generally bound by them. Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170
(Utah 1985).
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purchased when they (without Lefavi's participation) bought out the remaining partners.
Yet she refused to take into account the cost of buying those interests when deciding how
much of the profits she should award to Lefavi.
This error is legal (and mathematical) in nature, so the standard of review is that
of a conclusion of law:68 correction of error, with no deference to the conclusions of the
trial court.69
The court's conclusions and judgment would allow Lefavi to share in defendants'
one half interest in the Las Vegas Properties without allowing credit to Bertoch and
Poulson for their cost of acquiring the shares owned by DuBois, Daines and Nelson.
Before those purchases, Bertoch and Poulson each owned l/5th of Richards Street
Partnership. After those purchases Bertoch and Poulson each owned Vi of the Richards
Street Partnership; a difference with very large financial implications for the parties.
2.

The error cases extreme unfairness in determining damages. Had

Bertoch and Poulson not acquired DuBois, Daines and Nelson's shares, Bertoch and

58

See, Morse v. Packer, Supreme Court Docket # 97053 (Utah 1999).

69

Estate ofWolfinger v. Wolfmger, 793 P.2d 393 (Utah App. 1990); Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v.
Great Northern Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1987); Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d 542 (Utah App. 1989); Knight
v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah App. 1988); Hansen v. Hansen, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App.
1998). But see, Mostrong v. Jackson, 877 P.2D 1154 (Utah App. 1993).
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Poulson would have owned only 2/5 of Richards Street's lA interest, and Lefavi would
have only participated in their 2/5.
Put simply, in figuring Lefavi's "proportionate share" to apply, Judge Lewis (1)
gave him credit as if he were a participant in the buy-out of the additional partners; but
(2) she did not take the buy-out cost into account in figuring the amount of profits to
which the "proportionate shares" should be applied.70 If Lefavi is to share in the 3/5
partnership interests, then Bertoch and Poulson should receive credit for the cost of
that 3/5. Under no reasonable interpretation of the stipulated evidence could such a
formulation be proper. The matter should be remanded for a new trial, or at least for the
trial judge to redetermine damages, using the appropriate standards to determine
"proportionate share" within the parameters of the parties' stipulation.
D.

The trial court ignored undisputed evidence, and didn't do the math
correctly in determining "proportionate share."
1.

The trial court ruled contrary to undisputed evidence. Even though

Appellants' (Bertoch's and Poulson's) testimony, canceled checks and other documents
concerning the additional $665,019 invested by Appellants was undisputed, the trial

As a result of their agreements, Ex. #6 & 9, Bertoch and Lefavi each owned a "proportional interest"
[Ex. #9] in the Las Vegas Properties, and each was entitled to receive their "pro-rata share of the profits" [Ex. #6]
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court held that Appellants had not "marshaled the necessary evidence . . .to meet their
burden of proof' as to those items, and refused to include it as part of Appellants' cost
in computing Lefavi's "proportional interest." As a result, the Court awarded Lefavi
5.27% of the sale proceeds instead of 3.49% (the more correct percentage had the Court
included the $665,019).71
Appellee adduced no testimony or other evidence which disputed Appellants'
testimony, canceled checks and other documents which showed that Appellants had paid
$665,019 to buy the other 3/5 of the Richards partnership, and for commissions to
acquire the Las Vegas lots. Yet the court ignored it. This is another way of stating the
same error as is discussed in the immediately preceding section.
2.

There is no "marshaling the evidence" problem. At first blush it may

appear that portions of this brief are direct attacks on the Findings of Fact by the trial
court. If so, marshaling of the evidence would be necessary.72 Here, though, the

71

If properly computed the 5.27% share of sale proceeds awarded to Appellee should be corrected to
4.56%. Bertoch and Poulson asked for the correction, but were rebuffed by Judge Lewis. If an error in computing
the percentage is corrected, the 5.27% of sale proceeds awarded to Appellee should be corrected to 4.78%. The
Court found that Appellants cost was $1,440,368 and that Appellee's cost was $68,875, for a total cost of
$1,509,243. Based on those amounts. Appellee's "proportionate cost" was 4.56% [$68,875 + 1,509,243 = 4.56%].
72

Moon v. Moon, 1999 WL 22969 (Utah App. 1999). See also, Child v. Newsom, 354 Utah Adv. Rep.
21, 1998 WL 743724 (Utah 1998). The standard of review is whether "the evidence to support the verdict was
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." Id,
quoting Nelson v. Trujillo* 657 P.2d 730. 732 (Utah 1977). "To support an insufficiency of the evidence claim on
appeal, kthe one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate
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stipulation (Appendix D) makes marshaling of contrary evidence irrelevant. Where a
stipulation has been entered as to the facts, this Court is as well equipped as the trial
judge to apply the numbers to come up with a proper damage figure.
3.

Undisputed debt not allowed as an offset. Even though the evidence that

Appellant was entitled to a $53,715 offset for Bertoch's loan was undisputed, and
notwithstanding the adverse inference from Appellee having asserted his 5th amendment73
privilege, the Court held, oddly, that Appellants had not "marshaled the necessary
evidence . . .to meet their burden of proof'74 and did not allow the offset.
Lefavi did not adduce any evidence to dispute Bertoch's $53,715 offset for
Bertoch's loan. Instead, Appellee asserted his 5th amendment privilege against self-

tliat the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Child, supra, quoting
McCorvey v. State Dep Y. of Tramp., 868 P.2d 41, 44 (Utah 1993). These authorities relate to attacks on a jury
verdict, but essentially the same standard applies where, as here, the matter was tried to a judge. See, Interiors
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, 881 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah 1994).
73

If anything, the Fifth Amendment assertion can benefit Appellants, but cannot benefit Lefavi. See,

treatment of invocation of privilege in Hansen v. Hansen, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 1998); First Federal Sav. &
Loan Ass n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984); Affleck v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 655 P.2d 665 (Utah 1982).
74

For a discussion of the proper reference to "marshaling" evidence, see the immediately preceding

footnote.

43 - Lefavi v. Bertoch, Brief of Appellants

incrimination when asked about the stock transactions.75 Yet Judge Lewis denied that
amount and failed to allow it as an offset, with no evidence to dispute it.

75

Lefavi's assertion of his 5th Amendment privilege against self incrimination, together with Bertoch's
un-controverted testimony, meet the burden of proof regarding offset for debt owed by Lefavi.
When a party invokes the 5th amendment privilege, the court may draw adverse inferences against that
party. The standard of review regarding adverse inferences in claiming the 5th amendment is the "correction of
error" standard, with no deference to conclusions of the trial court. Hansen v. Hansen, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 25
(Utah App. 1998); First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984); Affleck v. Third
Judicial Dist Court, 655 P.2d 665 (Utah 1982).
"The proposition is well established that in civil cases a party's failure to respond to valid inquiries on the
basis of the privilege against self-incrimination can give rise to an adverse inference against that party at trial."
First Federal Sav. & LoanAss'n v. Schamanek. 684 P.2d 1257, 1268 (Utah 1984). citing Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed. 2d 810 (1976).
However, before an adverse inference will be drawn, an opposing party must advance evidence
independent of the inference that connects the party claiming the privilege with the assertions promulgated by the
opposing party. "[T]he inference is not enough, by itself, to sustain a judgment against [the party invoking the
privilege] without some other evidence." Id. 'The fact that a defendant in a civil suit assumes a substantial risk
when he chooses to assert his [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not, however, mean that the plaintiff is relieved of
his obligation to prove a case before he becomes entitled to judgment." Id. (a] 1268, citing Steinbrecher v.
WapnicK 248 N.E. 2d 419, 427 (1969).
In this case, plaintiff/appellee Lefavi invoked the 5th amendment privilege regarding questions relating to
the purchase and sale of securities that may have been in violation of the Securities and Exchange Commission
rules prohibiting insider trading. Bertoch established that the proceeds from the sale of these securities were
retained by Lefavi and that it was the intent of the parties that the proceeds of the sale of these securities would be
used as an offset. Lefavi refused to answer a questions regarding these securities. The lower court, however, did
not take into account un-controverted evidence proffered by Bertoch substantiating the purpose and the outcome of
the purchases and sales of the securities at issue. This un-controverted evidence, along with the 5th amendment
privilege invoked by Lefavi, establish that the account existed, that Lefavi took the proceeds from the sale of the
securities, that it was the intent of the parties that the stock be purchased, held and sold at an appropriate time to
offset any loss that Lefavi may assert against the appellants as a result of investing in the LV project.
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In August 1983, after the first sale, a partial accounting computed Lefavi's share
of the proceeds as $32,182, which Appellants paid to Appellee.76 The second sale was
in 1985 and the third was in 1988.77

The Court should have corrected the experts' math error78 in computing
each party's "proportionate interest" in the Project.

E.

No one doubts that Lefavi's investment was $68,875. Comparing this amount to
the total invested by the parties results in a percentage, which is the "proportionate share"
of the sale proceeds which the court found that Lefavi was entitled.

76

The accounting at the time of the first sale, which was in part prepared by a third-party CPA,
computed the share due to Appellee as exactly the $32,182 paid to Appellee. Appellee admits that he received and
retained that payment, but claims that it was paid as compensation for some vague service he allegedly furnished to
an unrelated entity in which Bertoch had a small financial interest. Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, the Court refused to allow credit to Appellants for that payment. Ex. 20 is a release, Lefavi is
bound by that release, his claims were extinguished by the release, and the Court should have so found. The
release Ex. 20, the payment to and retention by Lefavi of $32,182 as his share of the proceeds from the first sale,
and the Bertoch-Lefavi agreement pursuant to which Bertoch purchased and sold stock as directed by Lefavi and
gave Lefavi $36,693 to cover the shortfall on his investment in the Las Vegas Property, each constituted a
settlement, accord and satisfaction and/or payment to Lefavi, each of which bars Lefavi's claims herein.
77

No proceeds from the later sales were paid to Appellee because Appellants believed Appellee did not
own a share of the other lots.
78

See footnote #5, page 5 above.
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By comparing Lefavi's $68,87579 investment with the total investment in the Las
Vegas Properties ($2,105,387.3980 or $1,440,367.9581 or somewhere between82 those
stipulated to extremes), the accountants computed Lefavi's share as 3.49%83 if the Court
were to determine that payments by Appellants Bertoch and Poulson to Hansen and Bova
($101,519.44),84 DuBois ($163,500),85 Daines and Nelson ($400,000)86 are part of
defendants investment in the Las Vegas Properties, and Lefavi's share as 5.27%87 if the
Court determines that none of those payments by defendants are part of defendants
investment in the Las Vegas Project.

79

Line (7), Col. (B) of Ex. 140.

80

Line (19), Col (B), page 2 of Ex. 140. This $2,105,387.39 was the low end of the range stipulated to
by the parties and their accountant experts. See discussion above.
81

Line (15), Col (B), page 2 of Ex. 140. This $1,440,367.95 was the high end of the range stipulated to
by the parties and their accountant experts. See discussion above.
82

If the Court excludes as part of defendants' investment in the Las Vegas Properties, some but not all
of the items listed in Lines (16), (17), (18) or (19), Col (B), page 2 of Ex. 140, then defendants total investment
will decrease and Lefavi's percentage of the total investment will increase proportionately.
83

Line (21), Col. (B), page 2 of Ex. 140.

84

Line (16), Col. (B), page 2 of Ex. 140.

85

Line (17), Col. (B), page 2 of Ex. 140.

86

Line (18), Col. (B), page 2 of Ex. 140.

87

Line (20), Col. (B). page 2 of Ex. 140.
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In an effort to simplify the computation, the accountants applied their percentages
to each of the dollar amounts paid by Appellants, and determined the dollar amount of
change in the amount owed to Lefavi which would result if each of those individual
payments is included or excluded as part of appellants' investment in the Las Vegas
Properties. Those amounts from Ex. 140, and their effect on damages, are summarized
in the footnote.88
As discussed above, Appellants' commission payments to Hansen and Bova were
part of the cost of acquiring the Las Vegas Properties and the Court should find that they
are part of defendants investment in the Las Vegas Properties.
As discussed above, Appellants' purchase of 3/5 of the XA interest in the Las Vegas
Project from DuBois, Daines and Nelson increased defendants ownership share of the

88

The accountants" computation of the dollar amounts by which the damages owed to Lefavi will
decrease if individual items paid by Appellants for the Las Vegas Project are included or are not included in
computing defendants investment in the Las Vegas Properties are as follows (lifted from Exhibit 104):
Line# Item

Amount paid

Dollar reduction in
Amount due to Lefavi
{Applying proportionate share %}

(11)
(12)
(13)

Payment of Commissions to Hansen and Bova
$101,519
Buyout of DuBois share of the Las Vegas Properties 163,500 13,845
Buyout of Daines and Nelson
400,000
Totals
S 665,019

$ 8,596

(10)

Col. (B) - Minimum liability to Lefavi

103,406

(10)

Col. (C) - Maximum liability to Lefavi

$159,717

33,870
56,311
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Las Vegas Project from 2/5 of the V2 to 100% of the V2, and the Court should allow those
payments by defendants as part of the cost of their investment in the Las Vegas Project.
But for Appellants' purchase of the other 3/5 share, the parties would have owned only
2/5 of V2 of the Las Vegas Properties, and Lefavi's share would also be proportionately
reduced.
Lefavi cannot expect or be given the benefit of those purchases without allowing
defendants to include the cost of those purchases as part of their investment in the Las
Vegas Project. The trial court should have found that Appellants' payments to DuBois,
Daines and Nelson are part of defendants investment in the Las Vegas Properties, and
order the trial court to reduce the damages accordingly.

F.

Lefavi clearly benefitted from a stock transaction, but the trial court
erroneously refused to take that benefit into account
By stipulating to Ex. 140 Lefavi agreed that he had received $53,715 in excess of

his agreed share of the profits from stock purchased and sold by Appellant Bertoch as
directed by Lefavi. The $53,715 amount consists of $36,693 paid to Lefavi to cover the
"Principal Shortfall" on his investment in the Las Vegas Properties, and that he was also
overpaid $17,022 by Bertoch from proceeds from those stock transactions.
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Yet the trial judge failed to allow either of those amounts as credits against
amounts owed to Lefavi as his "proportionate share of the profits"89 from the Las Vegas
Properties. This would have been within the judge's discretion, if there had been any
contrary evidence; but there was not.
When asked about the stock transactions, Lefavi refused to answer and asserted
his 5th amendment rights against self-incrimination. Appellant Bertoch testified that the
stock profits were to be applied first to cover Lefavi's shortfall on his investment in the
Las Vegas Properties, and that the balance of the profit was to be divided equally
between Lefavi and Bertoch. Bertoch explained that Lefavi's "shortfall" was the
$36,69390 difference between the $68,875 invested by Lefavi and the $32,182 paid to
Lefavi from proceeds of the first sale. Lefavi has not disputed the stock agreement with
Bertoch, or that he received the $53,715. The evidence is undisputed that Bertoch is
entitled to an offset he did not receive, for that $53,715.

The $36,693 shortfall amount was stipulated to by Lefavi by agreeing to the statement in Line (16),
page 1 of Ex. 140, included in Appendix D to this Brief.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The trial Court has erred in the calculation of interest, the calculation of damages
and the proper treatment of a 5th amendment invocation. The matter should be remanded
and/or the judgment should be reduced and corrected.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, effective the 29th day of January, 1999, with
the final version filed on February 5, 1999.

Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

VIII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on February 5, 1999,1 caused to be mailed two true and
correct copies of the foregoing with attachment, postage prepaid, to the following:
Douglas E. Griffith, Esq., KESSLER & RUST, 36 South State #2000, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111
^

Ronald CTBarker
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

aaa^nvf

BRUCE A. LEFAVI, an individual,
ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

v.
RICHARD K. BERTOCH, an individual,
and WILLIAM E. POULSON, an
individual,

Civil No. 920906147 CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial beginning on August 25,1997 and continuing through August
29,1997 before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, with Plaintiff Bruce A. Lefavi (hereinafter "Lefavi")
being represented by his counsel, Joseph C. Rust and Douglas E. Griffith of Kesler & Rust, and the
Defendants Richard K. Bertoch (hereinafter "Bertoch") and William E. Poulson (hereinafter
"Poulson") being represented by their counsel, Ronald C. Barker.

uc-uJy Clerk

The Court having heard the evidence, having reviewed the exhibits, having heard the
arguments of counsel, having ruled from the bench at the conclusion of the trial and thereafter having
issued its Ruling in written form on December 22,1997 and an Amended Ruling on January 5,1998,
and the Court having now entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to this action, now
enters its Order of Final Judgment.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises aforesaid, it is
ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Bruce A. Lefavi is hereby awarded judgment against defendants Richard

K. Bertoch and William E. Poulson, jointly and severally, in the principal amount of
$159,717.00, together with prejudgment interest in the amount of $96,482.00 as of December 31,
1997, and additional prejudgment interest from January 1, 1998 to the date of judgment, which
is the date of execution of this Order, consisting of
additional prejudgment interest of $
$

.

days at the rate of $26.25 per day for
, for a total judgment of

It is further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented by

postjudgment interest, pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 15-1-4, at the rate of 7.468% simple per
annum from the date of judgment until paid in fall.
2.

The Counterclaims of defendants Bertoch and Poulson against Lefavi are dismissed

with prejudice pursuant to stipulation by the parties made on the record during the trial of this
action.
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Judgment rendered thi;
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I caused to be hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the ORDER
OF FINAL JUDGMENT in Civil No. 920906147CV, this %_ day of April, 1998, to:
Ronald C. Barker
BARKER LAW OFFICE
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Attorney for Defendants Bertoch and Poulson
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STATE OF UTAH

r!

BRUCE A. LEFAVI, an individual,
ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

RICHARD K. BERTOCH, an individual,
and WILLIAM E. POULSON, an
individual,

Civil No. 920906147 CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial beginning on August 25, 1997 and continuing through August
29,1997 before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, with Plaintiff Bruce A. Lefavi (hereinafter "Lefavi")
being represented by his counsel, Joseph C. Rust and Douglas E. Griffith of Kesler & Rust, and the
Defendants Richard K. Bertoch (hereinafter "Bertoch") and William E. Poulson (hereinafter
"Poulson") being represented by their counsel, Ronald C. Barker.

The Court having heard the evidence, having reviewed the exhibits, having heard the
arguments of counsel, having ruled from the bench at the conclusion of the trial and thereafter having
issued its Ruling in written form on December 22,1997 and an Amended Ruling on January 5,1998,
and the Court having now entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to this action, now
enters its Order of Final Judgment.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises aforesaid, it is
ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Bruce A. Lefavi is hereby awarded judgment against defendants Richard

K. Bertoch and William E. Poulson, jointly and severally, in the principal amount of
$159,717.00, together with prejudgment interest in the amount of $96,482.00 as of December 31,
1997, and additional prejudgment interest from January 1, 1998 to the date of judgment, which
is the date of execution of this Order, consisting of 149 days at the rate of $26.25 per day for
additional prejudgment interest of $3,911.25, for a total judgment of $260,110.25.

It is further

ordered that this judgment shall be augmented by postjudgment interest, pursuant to Utah Code
Anno. § 15-1-4, at the rate of 7.468% simple per annum from the date of judgment until paid in
full.
2.

The Counterclaims of defendants Bertoch and Poulson against Lefavi are dismissed

with prejudice pursuant to stipulation by the parties made on the record during the trial of this
action.

2

Judgment rendered this
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I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the ORDER OF
FINAL JUDGMENT in Civil No. 920906147CV, this
Ronald C. Barker
BARKER LAW OFFICE
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Attorney for Defendants Bertoch and Poulson
DOUGLAS E. GRIFFITH (4042)
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE A. LEFAVI, an individual,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
RICHARD K. BERTOCH, an individual,
and WILLIAM E. POULSON, an
individual,

Civil No. 920906147 CV
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

This matter came on for trial beginning on August 25, 1997 and continuing through August
29,1997 before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, with Plaintiff Bruce A. Lefavi (hereinafter "Lefavi")
being represented by his counsel, Joseph C. Rust and Douglas E. Griffith of Kesler & Rust, and the
Defendants Richard K. Bertoch (hereinafter "Bertoch") and William E. Poulson (hereinafter
"Poulson") being represented by their counsel, Ronald C. Barker. The Court having heard the
evidence, having reviewed the exhibits, and having heard the arguments of counsel, ruled from the

DsfijfYC!erk

bench at the conclusion of the trial and thereafter issued its Ruling in written form on December 22,
1997 and an Amended Ruling on January 5,1998. Based on the evidence heard and received by the
Court and based on its rulings issued in this action , the Court now enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Lefavi, Bertoch and Poulson are residents of Salt Lake County or were conducting

business in Salt Lake County and therefore are subject to the jurisdiction and venue of this Court.
2.

In and around the middle of 1975, Bertoch and Poulson acquired a portion of an

interest held by Dasco, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and Dudley Smith, a resident of Nevada, in
certain real properties located in Clark County, State of Nevada (hereinafter "the Las Vegas
Properties").
3.

As of February, 1976, Bertoch and Poulson's interest in or share of the Las Vegas

Properties was held in the name of Richard Street Development Company ("Richards Street"), an
unregistered partnership of which Bertoch and Poulson were partners.
4.

In 1982, Bertoch and Poulson's interest in the Las Vegas Properties was transferred

to Russell Road Development Co., a Nevada partnership ("Russell Road"), in exchange for a 50%
ownership of Russell Road.
5.

By July, 1978, the Las Vegas Properties, which consisted essentially of three parcels

of real property located near the Las Vegas Airport, known to the parties as Lot Numbers 8, 10 and
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11. Parcel 10 was being purchased on a contract, and the other parcels were leases and options to
purchase.
6.

On July 19, 1978, Bertoch and Poulson, by and through Bertoch, engaged in

discussions with Lefavi concerning Lefavi becoming an investor with them in their interest in the
Las Vegas Properties.
7.

During the July 19, 1978 meeting, Bertoch represented to Lefavi that he, Lefavi,

would be acquiring an interest in Bertoch and Poulson's joint interest in the Las Vegas Properties
and that such properties consisted of all of Lots 8, 10 and 11.
8.

During the July 19, 1978 meeting, Bertoch and Lefavi agreed that Lefavi was

participating in the Bertoch and Poulson partnership which held their interest in the Las Vegas
Properties and that when the properties sold, Lefavi would be "re-imbursed" [sic] his investment
principal, plus 8% per annum interest and a pro-rata share of the profits generated from the Las
Vegas Properties. The pro rata share would be determined by the total money invested by Lefavi
into the Las Vegas Properties compared to the total monies invested by Bertoch and Poulson into
the Las Vegas Properties.
9.

In reliance on Bertoch's representations, Lefavi made an initial investment in the

amount of $6,600.00 which he paid to Bertoch on July 19, 1978, and thereby acquired an interest
of Bertoch and Poulson's interest in the Las Vegas Properties. The investment and agreement was
memorialized in a memorandum drafted and signed by Bertoch dated July 19, 1978, admitted into
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evidence as Exhibit 6, and the memorandum, together with an attachment describing the Las Vegas
Properties, admitted into evidence as Exhibit 7, were delivered to Lefavi at the time of his
investment.
10.

From July, 1978 through December, 1980, Lefavi made additional investments with

Bertoch and Poulson by paying money to either Bertoch or Finco, a Utah corporation jointly owned
and controlled by Bertoch and Poulson. In total, Lefavi invested $68,875.00 in the Las Vegas
Properties.
11.

At the time of his said payments, and on other occasions from July 1978 through

December, 1980, Lefavi met with Bertoch and/or Poulson and discussed what was being done on
the Las Vegas Properties, how their respective interests were being calculated and what, if any,
changes were being made to their investment agreement.
12.

During one such meeting, held on April 19,1979, Bertoch, Poulson and Lefavi were

all present and agreed to change the terms and arrangement of Lefavi's investment in the Las Vegas
Properties. It was determined and agreed to by the parties that Lefavi's investment agreement would
be changed to a proportional share basis in exchange for Lefavi's contribution of money toward an
interest in the Las Vegas Properties. This agreement was memorialized in a memorandum drafted
and signed by Bertoch dated April 19, 1979, admitted into evidence as Exhibit 9.
13.

Lefavi's investment of a proportional interest in the Las Vegas Properties was to be

determined as follows: the total proceeds received by Bertoch and Poulson from the sale or lease of
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the Las Vegas Properties, less reasonable and anticipated closing costs and other expenses relating
to such closings, resulting in proceeds which would then be divided among Bertoch, Poulson, and
Lefavi in proportion to the total monies each had actually contributed to the Las Vegas Properties.
14.

No other terms regarding calculation of the proceeds, proportional share or deductible

expenses were agreed to by Bertoch, Poulson and Lefavi.
15.

In reliance on this modified agreement, Lefavi continued to invest monies into the

Las Vegas Properties from April, 1979 through December, 1980.
16.

According to their testimony given in Court, at the time Bertoch and Poulson solicited

Lefavi's investment in the Las Vegas Properties, Bertoch and Poulson claim to have intended
Lefavi's investment to be limited to: (a) an interest in Bertoch's share but not Poulson's share of
the Las Vegas Properties; (b) an interest in Lot 10 of the Las Vegas Properties but not an interest in
any of the other lots which constituted the Las Vegas Properties; (c) a return based solely on any net
profits received by Bertoch from the sale of Lot 10, and no return from the investment until Bertoch
had deducted any and all expenses as Bertoch deemed appropriate.
17.

At the time Bertoch and Poulson solicited Lefavi's investment in the Las Vegas

Properties, Bertoch and Poulson either misrepresented or omitted to disclose to Lefavi any of the
terms or conditions reflected in Paragraph 16 above, upon which material misrepresentations and
omissions Lefavi relied in making his investment in the Las Vegas Properties.
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18.

Had the terms and conditions of the investment as described in Paragraph 16 above

been fully disclosed to Lefavi, Lefavi never would have made the investment in the Las Vegas
Properties. Consequently, Lefavi's investment monies were obtained by Bertoch and Poulson by
false pretenses, false representations, material omissions and fraud.
19.

In June 1983, Lot 10 of the Las Vegas Properties was sold in a transaction with an

individual named Gilbert Sellan for $1,870,000.00, of which $1,200,000.00 was paid in cash and
$670,000.00 was paid in the form of a Promissory Note, secured by 22 residential lots in a
subdivision known as Vista Del Sol in Las Vegas, Nevada as reflected in Exhibits 45 and 49, which
were received and admitted.
20.

Ultimately, the entire purchase price for Lot 10 was paid through a foreclosure on the

Promissory Note and a foreclosure sale of the 22 lots of the Vista Del Sol.
21.

In response to the first sale of the Las Vegas Properties, Scott Poulson, a Certified

public Accountant who is also the son of defendant Poulson, prepared a summary and accounting
of all monies invested into the Las Vegas Properties by Poulson, Bertoch and Lefavi, which
summary was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 76.
22.

In or around June 1983, Bertoch, Poulson, and Lefavi met to discuss the first sale of

the Las Vegas Properties. During the meeting a copy of Exhibit 76, without the handwritten portion
on the third page thereof, was shown to Lefavi. In the meeting, Bertoch and Poulson represented
to Lefavi that no proceeds from that sale would be paid to either Bertoch or Poulson because all sale
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proceeds had been used to pay off other debts, encumbrances, and obligations against the remaining
parcels of the Las Vegas Properties. Consequently, Lefavi received no proceeds from the first sale
of the Las Vegas Properties.
23.

Contrary to Bertoch and Poulson's representations, a check for $415,257.92 was paid

to Bertoch and Poulson from the proceeds of the 1983 sale. In addition, Bertoch's 1983 tax returns,
admitted into evidence as Exhibit 115, reported the first sale of the Las Vegas Properties as an
installment sale for $450,296.00 as the total share which he expected to receive and reported
receiving $288,960 in 1983 from the first sale of the Las Vegas Properties. Poulson's 1983 tax
returns, admitted into evidence as Exhibit 104, reported the first sale of the Las Vegas Properties
as an installment sale for $414,018.00 as the total share which he expected to receive and reported
receiving $265,680.00 in 1983 from the first sale of the Las Vegas Properties.
24.

Subsequent to the 1983 sale, funding of the Las Vegas Properties was through bank

loans which were guaranteed by Bertoch and Poulson. As a result, neither Bertoch nor Poulson
invested any more of their own monies in the Las Vegas Properties.
25.

From the 1983 sale through 1988, certain portions of the Las Vegas Properties were

leased, and generated income which was used to pay joint venture expenses.
26.

From 1983 to 1991, Lefavi continually inquired of Bertoch and Poulson whether any

additional sales of the Las Vegas Properties had occurred. In each instance, Bertoch or Poulson told
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Lefavi no sales were occurring and the remaining portion of the Las Vegas Properties was still held
by the parties.
27.

Despite the foregoing representations by Bertoch and Poulson, two sales did in fact

occur on the Las Vegas Properties between 1983 and 1991.
28.

In 1985, portions of Lots 8 and 11 were sold to Clark County for $2,962,000.00, of

which $700,000.00 was paid in cash and $2,262,000.00 was paid with a Promissory Note secured
by the Las Vegas Properties being sold. From 1985 through 1988, Clark County paid tax-free
interest on the Promissory Note. Such interest was used to pay interest on a trust deed note filed
against the same property. In March 1988, Clark County paid off the entire remaining balance of
the Note.
29.

As a result of the 1985 sale to Clark County, Bertoch and Poulson each reported on

their 1985 tax returns, admitted into evidence as Exhibits 117 and 106 respectively, installment sales
of $740,500.00 attributable to their respective shares of the Las Vegas Properties sold to Clark
County. Each reported receipt of $175,000.00 and a taxable profit of $89,250.00 from the sale for
the 1985 tax year.
30.

In December, 1988, the final remaining portions of the Las Vegas Properties were

sold to Las Vegas Resorts, Inc. for $2,865,000.00, of which $1,432,500.00 was paid in the form of
28,650,000 shares of restricted stock in Las Vegas Resorts, Inc. and $1,432,500.00 was paid in the
form of a Promissory Note to be paid by January, 1991.
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31.

As a result of this sale to Las Vegas Resorts, Inc., Bertoch and Poulson each reported

on their 1989 tax returns, admitted into evidence as Exhibits 121 and 110 respectively, an installment
sale of $393,938.00 attributable to their respective shares of the Las Vegas Properties sold to Las
Vegas Resorts, Inc. Each reported having received $35,813.00 of that amount in 1989.
32.

Bertoch and Poulson received their proportional share of the restricted stock of Las

Vegas Resorts, Inc. in April, 1989, which amounted to 7,162,500 shares each.
33.

In February, 1991, Bertoch and Poulson each received a cash disbursement in excess

of $300,000.00 when the Las Vegas Resorts, Inc. promissory note was paid in full. As a result of
the Las Vegas Resorts, Inc. note being paid, Bertoch and Poulson each reported on their 1991 tax
returns, admitted into evidence as Exhibits 123 and 112 respectively, total sale proceeds of
$358,125.00 attributable to their respective shares of the note proceeds received from Las Vegas
Resorts, Inc.
34.

The most credible and reliable evidence establishing the proceeds received by Bertoch

and Poulson in connection with the sale of Las Vegas Properties are the tax returns of Bertoch and
Poulson, which were prepared closely in time to the receipt of such proceeds.
35.

Based on calculations agreed to by both parties' accounting experts, stipulated to by

the parties as accurate, presented to the Court as Exhibit 140, and admitted into evidence, the gross
proceeds actually and constructively received by Bertoch and Poulson from their share of the Las
Vegas Properties totaled $3,300,033.00 (the total of lines (1) and (2) of page 1 of Exhibit 140).
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36.

In and about September, 1991, Lefavi, still believing no sales of the Las Vegas

Properties had occurred since 1983, approached Bertoch and requested that his name be placed on
the Clark County records as partial owner of the Las Vegas Properties, so that his ownership interest
in the Las Vegas Properties would be a matter of public record.
37.

During that conversation, Bertoch disclosed to Lefavi for the first time that all of the

Las Vegas Properties had been sold.
38.

On or about September 19, 1991, Bertoch met with Lefavi and represented that

although all of the Las Vegas Properties had been sold, no proceeds had been distributed to either
Bertoch or Poulson as the result of such sales.
39.

Bertoch disclosed that the only consideration that he and Poulson had received as a

result of the sales of the Las Vegas Properties was certain restricted stock in Las Vegas Resorts, Inc.
40.

Bertoch presented to Lefavi two stock certificates, admitted into evidence as Exhibit

21, one in the name of William Poulson and one in the name of Richard Bertoch, each certificate
totaling 716,250 shares or 10% of their holdings of Las Vegas Resorts stock.
41.

During this meeting, Bertoch stated that the delivery of this stock to Lefavi

constituted a 100% reimbursement of Lefavi's interest in the Las Vegas Properties and that there
would be no other proceeds which he was entitled to receive because there were no other proceeds
received by Bertoch and Poulson.
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42.

Bertoch then requested that Lefavi execute a letter acknowledging that he had

received the stock certificates as represented by Bertoch. Lefavi executed the letter, admitted into
evidence as Exhibit 20, prepared by Bertoch and dated September 19, 1991.
43.

At the request of Lefavi to support the income tax reporting of Lefavi's interest in the

Las Vegas Properties, on December 15,1991, Bertoch sent a letter to Lefavi, admitted into evidence
as Exhibit 23, stating that the only consideration Lefavi had received in return for his investment in
the Las Vegas Properties was the 1,432,500 shares of restricted stock in Las Vegas Resort, Inc.
44.

As set forth above, from 1983, the date of the first sale of the Las Vegas Properties,

through 1991, Bertoch and Poulson committed fraud by selling portions of the Las Vegas Properties
while misrepresenting to Lefavi that no sales were occurring and that the Las Vegas Properties were
still being held by the parties.
45.

As a result of the above-referenced fraud, Bertoch and Poulson obtained by false

pretenses, false representations and material omissions, and actual fraud Lefavi's share of the
proceeds generated from the sales of Las Vegas Properties, which share is determined below.
46.

As a direct result of the above-referenced fraud, Lefavi was delayed and prevented

by Beitoch and Poulson from discovery on a timely basis the sales of the Las Vegas Properties and
the resulting proceeds attributable to Lefavi's share, and was denied the opportunity to pursue
payment of such proceeds when they were distributed to Bertoch and Poulson, in trust for Lefavi.
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47.

As a direct result of the above-referenced fraud, Bertoch and Poulson breached the

fiduciary trust Bertoch and Poulson had assumed toward Lefavi when they had solicited and
accepted his monies for a proportional share of their interest in the Las Vegas Properties and held
his interest together with their own in the Las Vegas Properties.
48.

In the latter part of December, 1991, Lefavi contacted Dudley Smith of Dasco, Inc.,

the Nevada based partner in the Las Vegas Properties, and questioned him regarding the proceeds
received from sales of the Las Vegas Properties.
49.

In the course of such conversation and upon receipt of documents sent by Dudley

Smith, Lefavi learned for the first time that the three sales of the Las Vegas Properties had yielded
substantial proceeds to the parties, including Bertoch and Poulson. Dudley Smith's cover letter to
Lefavi was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 22.
50.

Upon receiving Exhibit 22 and other materials from Dudley Smith, Lefavi confronted

Bertoch with his new found knowledge of the sales proceeds received from the Las Vegas Properties
and Bertoch agreed to provide Lefavi a full accounting of such proceeds received. Bertoch also
promised that to the extent there were any monies due and owing Lefavi, Bertoch would make sure
Lefavi was paid.
51.

There was insufficient credible or admissible evidence presented during the course

of the trial which would support the claims of Bertoch and Poulson to having made certain payments
to Lefavi from the Las Vegas Properties sales, adjustments to the calculation of proportional interests
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of the parties, and offsets and expenses which would reduce Lefavi's share of the proceeds
attributable to Bertoch and Poulson's interest in the Las Vegas Properties..
52.

There was insufficient credible or admissible evidence presented during the course

of the trial which would support Bertoch and Poulson's claims that the following items relate to and
reduce or affect the proceeds due Lefavi from his investment in the Las Vegas Properties: (a)
payments of commissions to Hansen and Bova; (b) a buy out of DuBois; (c) a buy out of Daines and
Nelson; (d) deduction for additional general and administrative expenses; (e) a payment to Lefavi
of $32,182.00; (f) amounts paid to Lefavi from stock profits; and (g) amounts paid to Lefavi on stock
transactions.
53.

In reliance on Exhibit 140 which was prepared and calculated by the respective

accounting experts for Lefavi on the one hand and Bertoch and Poulson on the other, and stipulated
to by the parties as accurately portraying the applicable dollars amounts for the Court to consider in
its ruling, the total proceeds attributable to Bertoch and Poulson is $3,203,875.00 from sales of the
Las Vegas Properties, plus $96,158.00 from a sublease resulting from the Las Vegas Properties, for
total proceeds of $3,300,033.00.
54.
$1,440,368.00.

The total investment basis of Bertoch and Poulson in the Las Vegas Properties is
Inasmuch as Lefavi's total investment is $68,875.00, Lefavi's proportional share

of the total proceeds of Bertoch and Poulson is 5.27%.
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55.

Lefavi is entitled to a return of his principal of $68,875.00, together with 5.27% of

the gross profit from Bertoch and Poulson's share from the sales and subleases of the Las Vegas
Properties, which gross profit, as contained in Exhibit 140, is $1,859,665.00, of which Lefavi's share
is $98,004.00, resulting in the total amount of $166,880.00 as Lefavi's share of Bertoch and
Poulson's interest in the Las Vegas Properties.
56.

The only payment made by Bertoch and Poulson to Lefavi as a return on his share

of the total proceeds from Lefavi's investment with Bertoch and Poulson was the Las Vegas Resort
stock which has a value of $7,163.00.
57.

After deducting the $7,163.00 payment to Lefavi from his share of the total proceeds,

Bertoch and Poulson are liable to Lefavi for the unpaid principal balance due and owing for his
interest in the Las Vegas Properties in the amount of $159,717.00.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
58.

By a preponderance of the evidence, Lefavi established that Lefavi entered into a

valid and binding contract with Bertoch and Pouison, who were acting as partners, by which Bertoch
and Pouison sold to Lefavi a proportional share in their interest in the Las Vegas Properties.
59.

By a preponderance of the evidence, Lefavi established that Bertoch and Pouison

breached the contract when they failed and refused to pay to Lefavi his proportional share of the
proceeds they received from the Las Vegas Properties, which unpaid proportional share totals
$159,717.00.
60.

By a preponderance of the evidence, Lefavi established that there was no legal excuse

for Bertoch and Pouison's failure to perform on the contract.
61.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that Bertoch and

Pouison committed actual fraud on Lefavi at the inception of the investment when Bertoch and
Pouison misrepresented and omitted to disclose to Lefavi material facts concerning the scope, terms
and conditions of Lefavi's investment.
62.

Lefavi in reasonable reliance on false representations, false pretenses and materials

omissions by Bertoch and Pouison invested monies in the amount of $68,875.00 with Bertoch and
Pouison.
63.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that Bertoch and

Pouison also committed a continuing fraud on Lefavi beginning in 1983 and continuing through
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1991 by making false representations and false pretenses, and omitting to disclose material facts
regarding the sales of the Las Vegas Properties and the proceeds received therefrom by Bertoch and
Poulson.
64.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that Bertoch and

Poulson committed conversion of Lefavi's funds when they received Lefavi's proportional share of
the proceeds from each of the sales of the Las Vegas Properties and then withheld and converted for
their own use Lefavi's proceeds.
65.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that the

investment solicited by Bertoch and Poulson from Lefavi created a fiduciary relationship and duty
of trust on the part of Bertoch and Poulson for the benefit of Lefavi, and Bertoch and Poulson
breached their fiduciary duty of care when they obtained and retained for their own benefit Lefavi's
share of the proceeds received from the Las Vegas Properties.
66.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that Lefavi

established that Bertoch and Poulson breached the fiduciary duty owed among partners to deal with
each other in good faith and to disclose material matters, which breach directly caused damages to
Lefavi.
67.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that Lefavi did

not fail to mitigate his damages because Bertoch and Poulson's actions, misrepresentations, and
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omissions toward Lefavi regarding the sales of the Las Vegas Properties denied Lefavi access to
sufficient information required to mitigate his damages.
68.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that the

September 19, 1991 letter (Exhibit 20) executed by Lefavi does not constitute a waiver or release
by Lefavi of any of his claims, the document itself is void of any release or waiver language, and no
consideration, beyond that to which Lefavi was already entitled, was paid by Bertoch or Poulson to
obtain any such release or waiver of claims.
69.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that Lefavi's

signature on Exhibit 20 was obtained by fraudulent inducement by Bertoch through his direct
misrepresentations and material omissions regarding the sales of the Las Vegas Properties given at
the time the document was executed by Lefavi.
70.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that there has

been no accord and satisfaction or payment to Lefavi for his investment in the Las Vegas Properties.
71.

The counterclaims of Bertoch and Poulson, consisting the claims of malicious

prosecution, abusive civil process, and breach of contract with regard to the Las Vegas properties
joint venture or the securities transactions, were treated as affirmative claims and dismissed by
stipulation during trial. However, Bertoch and Poulson reserved their claim regarding the securities
transactions as offsets or affirmative defenses.
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72.

By clear and convincing testimony and evidence, Lefavi established that all

applicable statute of limitations relating to Lefavi's claims were tolled by reason of Bertoch and
Poulson's fraud and fraudulent inducement resulting from their false representations concerning no
sales of the Las Vegas Properties, consequently, Lefavi's claims were timely brought.
73.

By a preponderance of the evidence, Lefavi established that the contractual

obligations to pay proceeds to Lefavi based on sales of the Las Vegas Properties was one continual
contract consisting of a series of payments due when the portions of the Las Vegas Properties were
sold and proceeds paid, which continuous, ongoing contract was not breached in its entirety until
February, 1991, when the final proceeds were paid to Bertoch and Poulson from the promissory note
on the sale to Las Vegas Resorts, Inc. and the appropriate share of such proceeds were not paid to
Lefavi.

Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations did not begin to run until February 1991.
74.

The damages incurred by Lefavi in connection with his claims of breach of contract,

fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duties are complete, fixed as to a particular time, and the
loss can be measured by facts and figures, or in other words, ascertained with mathematical certainty,
as demonstrated by the parties' stipulation to the applicable calculations and amounts contained in
Exhibit 140.
75.

The claims of Lefavi are based on causes of actions at law, as well as equity, and are

within the perimeters and policy of applicable Utah case law for the awarding of prejudgment
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interest in order to fully compensate Lefavi for his actual losses and prevent unjust enrichment to
Bertoch and Poulson who intentionally withheld amounts due and owing Lefavi.
76.

Pursuant to applicable statute, Lefavi is entitled to interest at the rate of 6% simple

interest on the total proceeds which should have been paid to Lefavi, which interest is to be
calculated from the dates proceeds were received by Bertoch and Poulson until the date of judgment,
and thereafter the judgment amount should accrue interest at the judgment rate until paid in full.
Therefore, pre-judgment interest is awarded in the amount of $96,482.00 from the applicable dates
up through December 31,1997, and interest accrues thereafter to the date of judgment at the rate of
$26.25 per day.
77.

As to the First Cause of Action for Breach of Contract, Lefavi is entitled to be

awarded judgment in the principal amount of $159,717.00, together with prejudgment interest in
the amount of $96,482.00 as of December 31, 1997, and thereafter to the date of judgment at the
rate of $26.25 per day, and interest at the judgment rate as set forth by Utah statute from the date
of judgment until paid.
78.

As to the Second Cause of Action for Fraud, Lefavi is entitled to be awarded

judgment in the principal amount of $159,717.00, together with prejudgment interest in the
amount of $96,482.00 as of December 31, 1997, and thereafter to the date of judgment at the rate
of $26.25 per day, and interest at the judgment rate as set forth by Utah statute from the date of
judgment until paid.
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79.

As to the Third Cause of Action for Conversion, Lefavi is entitled to be awarded

judgment in the principal amount of $159,717.00, together with prejudgment interest in the
amount of $96,482.00 as of December 31, 1997, and thereafter to the date of judgment at the rate
of $26.25 per day, and interest at the judgment rate as set forth by Utah statute from the date of
judgment until paid.
80.

As to the Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Care, Lefavi is

entitled to be awarded judgment in the principal amount of $159,717.00, together with
prejudgment interest in the amount of $96,482.00 as of December 31, 1997, and thereafter to the
date of judgment at the rate of $26.25 per day, and interest at the judgment rate as set forth by
Utah statute from the date of judgment until paid.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Attorney for defendants Bertoch and Poulson
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APPENDIX "D"

Exhibit 401 ^ °

Lefavi v. Bertoch, et. al.
Calculation of Results of Transactions Using Tax Return Information
(A)
Selling Price
(1) Bertoch/Poulson/Lefavi Share of Selling Price per Tax Returns
(2) Plus: Adjustment to Arrive at 50% of Selling Price1
(3) Bertoch/Poulson/Lefavi Adjusted Share of Selling Price (14 of total sales price)2

(B)
Amount
$ 3,133,190.00
70,685.00
$3,203,875.00

Purchase Price
(4) Bertoch/Poulson/Lefavi Cost Basis per Tax Returns
(5) Plus: Adjustment to Arrive at 50% of Tax Basis1
(6) Plus Acquisition-Related Costs Not Included in Tax Basis:
(7)
Payment to Lawyer's Title on Sellan Sale to Release Encumbrances
(8)

Payment to Levinson of 11 months Interest on Sellan Sale

(9)

Payment of Taxes, Revenue Stamps, & Recording Fees on Sellan Sale

(10)

Payment to Keltner on Clark County Sale

(11) Payment of Interest to Levinson on Clark County Sale
(12) Payment of Rent to Lamb on Clark county Sale
(13) Payment of Taxes, Revenue Stamps, Etc. on Clark County Sale
(14) Payment of Taxes on LV Resorts Sale
(15) BASIS UNDER MAXIMUM DAMAGE CALCULATION

$ 1,286,865.00
20,758.00
44,928.52
18,012.69
5,431.08
45,477.87
5,716.19
2,358.02
7,495.48
3,325.11
$1,440,367.95

Application of Disputed Issues of Fact:
(16)

Payment of Commissions to Hansen and Bova

101,519.44

(17)
(18)

Buyout of DuBois
Buyout of Daines and Nelson

163,500.00
400,000.00

(19) BASIS UNDER MINIMUM DAMAGE CALCULATION

$2,105,387.39

Lefavi Percentage Interest in Gross Investment
(20) LEFAVI PERCENTAGE UNDER MAXIMUM DAMAGE CALCULATION

5.27%

(21) LEFAVI PERCENTAGE UNDER MINIMUM DAMAGE CALCULATION

3.49%

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

\H0

Exhibit 400

Lefavi v. Bertoch, et. al.
CALCULATION OF UNDER/(OVER)PAYMENT TO BRUCE LEFAVI
Tax Return Method
(B)

(C)

MINIMUM
$3,203,875
96,158
2,105.387
$1.194.646

MAXIMUM
$3,203,875
96,158
1,440,368
$1,859.665

(A)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Bertoch/Poulson/Lefavi Adjusted Share of Selling Price
Plus: Net benefit from Sellan sublease
Less: Bertoch/Poulson/Lefavi Adjusted Share of Purchase Price
Gross Profit from Sales of Properties 1(1) - (2)1

$

5.27%
98.004

68.875
$ 110.569

$

68,875
166,880

7,163
$ 103,406

$

7,163
159,717

5,951

$

17,287

(5) Multiplied by: Lefavi Percentage of Gross Investment
(6) Net Lefavi Interest in Profit from Sales [(5) - (6)]

$

(7) Plus: Lefavi Investment in Properties
(8) Lefavi Total Interest in Sales [(7) + (8)]
(9) Less: Payment of Stock
(10) AMOUNT UNPAID BEFORE DISPUTED CREDITS

3.49%
41.693

Reconciliation of Amounts Unpaid Before Disputed Credits
AMOUNT UNPAID BEFORE DISPUTED CREDITS - MAXIMUM
(11)
(12)
(13)

Payment of Commissions to Hansen and Bova
Buyout of DuBois
Buyout of Daines and Nelson

AMOUNT UNPAID BEFORE DISPUTED CREDITS - MINIMUM

Affect of Additional Fact Disputes:
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)

General & Administrative Expenses
Check #1148
Amounts Paid to Lefavi from Stock Profits to Cover Principal Shortfall
Overpayment to Lefavi on Stock Transactions

36,693
17,022

36,693
17,022

